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How	the	political	capture	of	state	owned	enterprises	is
damaging	democracy	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe
Corruption	is	still	viewed	as	a	key	problem	in	many	states	across	Central	and
Eastern	Europe.	Drawing	on	recent	research	in	Bulgaria,	the	Czech	Republic,
and	Romania,	Clara	Volintiru,	Bianca	Toma	and	Alexandru	Damian
highlight	the	problem	of	political	actors	using	resources	from	state	owned
companies	to	help	win	elections.	They	argue	that	a	widespread	lack	of
accountability	in	managing	public	resources	is	threatening	the	quality	of
democracy	in	these	states.
Faced	with	political	turmoil,	the	new	democracies	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	remain	as	vulnerable	as	ever	to
state	capture	and	weakening	accountability	mechanisms.	In	January,	the	Czech	Republic’s	recently	elected	populist
Prime	Minister	Andrej	Babis	resigned	after	a	no-confidence	vote	in	the	country’s	parliament	following	fraud	charges
against	him.
Meanwhile,	since	winning	elections	a	little	over	a	year	ago,	the	incumbent	Social	Democratic	Party	in	Romania	has
reshuffled	the	government	three	times	(on	each	occasion	deposing	its	own	prime-ministers	in	parliament)	and	has
faced	numerous	protests	over	judicial	reforms	intended	to	roll	back	on	anti-corruption	efforts.	The	government’s
recent	calls	to	remove	the	country’s	chief	anti-corruption	prosecutor	have	brought	the	EU’s	focus	onto	the	issue.
Bulgaria	is	also	struggling	with	the	phenomenon	of	corruption,	with	the	weaknesses	of	their	new	anti-corruption
legislation	taking	centre-stage	during	its	presidency	of	the	Council	of	the	European	Union.
The	picture	that	emerges	from	these	cases	is	that	electoral	outcomes	are	increasingly	generating	instability	in	the
region,	with	political	crises	becoming	regular	occurrences.	These	democratic	crises	are	linked	to	issues	of	trust	and
accountability	on	the	part	of	political	parties.	Processes	of	cartelisation	coupled	with	the	clientelistic	distribution	of
public	goods	and	services	can	improve	the	chances	of	a	party	surviving	in	office,	but	they	do	little	to	foster	legitimacy
or	credibility.	Furthermore,	processes	of	state	capture	make	political	parties	addicted	to	a	continuous	supply	of	public
funds	and	resources.
Tapping	into	public	resources:	Political	control	over	state	owned	enterprises
As	part	of	a	project	entitled	State-Owned	Companies	–	Preventing	Corruption	and	State	Capture,	we	have	evaluated
the	extent	of	state	capture	and	the	nature	of	mechanisms	for	extracting	public	resources	for	private	or	political
interests	in	Bulgaria,	the	Czech	Republic,	Italy,	and	Romania.
State	owned	enterprises	(SOEs)	are	an	important	vehicle	for	economic	growth.	From	South	Africa	to	Eastern	Europe,
they	often	constitute	a	‘golden	goose’	for	ruling	political	parties.	There	are	three	main	types	of	resources	that	a
clientelistic	political	party	could	be	interested	in:	public	jobs,	public	contracts,	and	public	finances.	Given	the
extension	of	state	owned	enterprises	in	EU	countries,	low	public	scrutiny	and	their	scattered	distribution	(local,
regional,	national),	such	companies	are	often	easy	targets	for	corrupt	and	clientelistic	approaches.
Western	Europe	is	currently	pushing	through	reforms	to	accelerate	market	liberalisation	and	the	competitiveness	of
the	remaining	state	owned	enterprises.	In	contrast,	states	in	Eastern	Europe	have	a	greater	tendency	to	use	illiberal
or	nationalist	discourses	to	ensure	as	much	discretionary	control	as	possible	over	their	assets.	If	public	contracts	or
public	jobs	are	important	for	clientelistic	distribution,	very	few	institutions	can	rival	the	budgets	of	the	largest	state
owned	enterprises.
The	‘laggards’	or	late	comers	of	the	European	Union,	Bulgaria	and	Romania,	face	numerous	developmental
challenges:	from	poverty	to	institutional	weakness.	Looking	at	such	indicators	as	economic	development	at	the
regional	level	or	minimum	wages,	one	consistently	finds	them	at	the	lower	end	of	the	EU	rankings.	Deeply	connected
to	the	developmental	challenges	of	Romania	and	Bulgaria	is	the	institutional	corrosion	of	corruption.	Nevertheless,
over	the	last	few	years	successful	anti-corruption	criminal	investigations	have	been	implemented	in	Romania,	even	if
little	has	been	done	in	the	sense	of	prevention	or	recovery.	Many	domestic	and	international	stakeholders	see	the
anti-corruption	efforts	as	a	test	of	the	EU’s	positive	influence	in	these	two	countries.
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The	resources	of	state	owned	enterprises	are	often	used	to	fund	political	parties	or	electoral	campaigns.	Their
resources	mainly	serve	as	‘post	electoral	rewards’	for	political	backers,	disrupting	electoral	cycles	and	hindering	one
of	the	key	requisites	of	a	democratic	system:	accountability.	Discretionary	use	of	national	resources	through	state
owned	enterprises	goes	hand	in	hand	with	party	patronage	and	a	lack	of	merit	based	appointments.
State	owned	enterprises	in	Romania,	Bulgaria	and	the	Czech	Republic	are	‘populated’	with	politically	appointed
individuals,	especially	in	the	well-paid	top	positions.	State	owned	companies	in	Romania	offer	no	fewer	than	877
positions	on	the	Board	of	Directors,	which	are	appointed	by	the	State,	and	the	monthly	remuneration	varies	from
approximately	1,000	euros	to	30,000	euros.	In	a	widely	used	index	of	party	patronage	(shown	in	the	figure	below),
Romania	has	a	worse	ranking	than	Bulgaria	and	the	Czech	Republic	when	it	comes	to	overall	patronage,	although
the	Czech	Republic	appears	to	be	heavily	politicised	at	the	central	government	level.	Party	patronage	is	visibly	more
prevalent	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	than	it	is	in	other	new	democracies	such	as	Portugal	and	Spain.
Figure:	Index	of	party	patronage	(selected	countries)
Source:	Kopecky	et	al	2016,	Volintiru	2015
High	levels	of	politicisation	can	generate	institutional	instability.	Research	conducted	by	the	Romanian	Center	for
European	Policies	shows	that,	in	the	case	of	Romania,	state	owned	enterprises	have	an	average	management
duration	of	less	than	one	year,	with	political	changes/electoral	cycles	triggering	changes	in	the	management	of	state
owned	companies	on	almost	every	occasion.	Similar	political	trends	are	present	in	the	Czech	Republic,	where	in	the
years	leading	up	to	elections,	around	88%	of	the	chairs	of	supervisory	boards	of	companies	owned	by	municipalities
have	been	replaced.
The	key	challenge	faced	by	state	owned	enterprises	in	Bulgaria	is	also	political	interference,	as	a	recent	analysis	by
the	Bulgarian	NGO,	Risk	Monitor,	has	shown.	In	Bulgaria,	the	only	case	in	which	a	state	company	director	has	been
charged	and	convicted	of	corruption	(the	director	of	the	Toplofikacia	Sofia	EAD	heating	company	serving	the	city	of
Sofia)	was	related	to	the	influence	of	politics.
In	the	Czech	Republic,	accusations	of	political	influence	and	corruption	linked	to	state	owned	enterprises	have	close
links	with	almost	all	the	heads	of	government	over	the	last	ten	years.	This	includes	accusations	over	appointments	to
the	supervisory	boards	of	members	of	political	parties,	according	to	a	study	conducted	by	Candole	Partners.
In	Romania,	well-paid	positions	in	state-owned	companies	have	been	and	will	continue	to	be	used	either	as	rewards
for	political	sponsors	and	their	relatives,	or	as	a	way	to	supplement	wages	in	the	central	public	administration.
Romanian	anti-corruption	prosecutors	have	shown	how	the	resources	of	state	owned	enterprises	have	been	involved
in	most	electoral	campaigns	in	recent	years.
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The	Romanian	presidential	campaign	of	2009	involved	illegal	funding	in	exchange	for	influence	over	high-level
appointments	at	the	most	important	and	profitable	gas	companies,	as	well	as	the	nomination	of	the	Minister	of
Economy.	In	another	case,	the	National	Anti-Corruption	Directorate	is	investigating	fictitious	advertising	contracts
signed	by	a	state	owned	company	covering	costs	related	to	the	2009	presidential	campaign.	At	the	local	level,	there
are	dozens	of	cases	where	illegal	funding	originating	from	public	utilities	procurement	contracts	have	allegedly	been
used	for	election	campaigns.
Why	do	we	need	accountability?
In	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	corruption	and	capture	risks	have	yet	to	be	mitigated.	With	the	exception	of	Romania,
which	has	a	high	number	of	criminal	investigations,	there	has	been	a	weak	response	by	judicial	bodies	to
discretionary	control	over	state	resources.	According	to	our	research,	new	European	democracies	suffer	from
inefficient	preventive,	control	and	auditing	measures.
Without	proper	monitoring	and	sanctioning	mechanisms	in	place,	state	owned	companies	and	other	public
institutions	are	vulnerable	to	discretionary	control.	Public	resources	may	essentially	become	private	resources	at	the
disposal	of	ruling	politicians.	The	lack	of	accountability	in	managing	public	resources,	be	they	jobs	or	funding,	risks
invalidating	the	social	contract	in	these	states.	Some	ruling	parties	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	are	no	longer	(and
perhaps	never	were)	doing	the	work	of	the	electorate;	rather	they	control	wealthy	public	assets	and	have	captured
the	resources	they	need	to	win	elections	through	clientelistic	methods,	severely	affecting	the	quality	of	democracy	in
these	countries.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
_________________________________
About	the	authors
Clara	Volintiru	–	Bucharest	University	of	Economic	Studies
Clara	Volintiru	is	an	Associate	Professor	at	the	Bucharest	University	of	Economic	Studies	(ASE).	She
has	a	PhD	in	Political	Science	from	LSE	and	her	recent	research	can	be	found	in	East	European
Politics,	European	Political	Science	Review	(EPSR),	or	Research	&	Politics.	She	has	been	a	consultant
for	international	organisations	such	as	the	World	Bank,	European	Commission,	Eurofound,	and	the
Committee	of	Regions.
Bianca	Toma	–	Romanian	Center	for	European	Policies
Bianca	Toma	is	Programme	Director	at	the	Romanian	Center	for	European	Policies	and	is	involved	in
projects	related	to	the	judicial	system,	anti-corruption	and	state	capture.	She	has	over	15	years	of
experience	as	a	journalist,	including	as	a	Brussels-based	correspondent	for	Romanian	media.
Alexandru	Damian	–	Romanian	Center	for	European	Policies
Alexandru	Damian	is	a	Researcher	at	the	Romanian	Center	for	European	Policies.	He	is
involved	in	projects	related	to	foreign	affairs,	the	Eastern	Partnership,	the	judiciary	and
anti-corruption.	He	is	a	graduate	of	Political	Science	and	has	an	MA	in	EU	Studies	from
the	Free	University	of	Brussels.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: How the political capture of state owned enterprises is damaging democracy in Central and Eastern
Europe
Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-03-05
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/03/05/how-the-political-capture-of-state-owned-enterprises-is-damaging-democracy-in-central-and-eastern-europe/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
